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Abstract
Using annual data for 18 OECD countries over the period 1980-2004, we investigate how
labour and financial factors interact to determine unemployment by estimating a dynamic
panel model using the system generalized method of moments (GMM). We show that the
impact of financial variables depends strongly on the labour market context. Increased
market capitalization as well as decreased banking concentration reduce unemployment if
the level of labour market regulation, union density and coordination in wage bargaining
is low. The above financial variables have no effect otherwise. Increasing intermediated
credit and banking concentration is beneficial for employment when the degree of labour
market regulation, union density and coordination in wage bargaining is high. These results
suggest that the respective virtues of ed and market-based finance are crucially tied to the
labour market context.
JEL Codes: E24, J23, P17.
Key words: Unemployment, institutional complementarities and substituabilities, la-
bour market, financial system.
∗CEPN-Université Paris XIII, EEP, CEPREMAP and IZA, e-mail: gatti@pse.ens.fr or
gatti@univ-paris13.fr
†Université d’Orléans, LEO, Rue de Blois-B.P.6739, 45067 Orléans Cedex 2, France; email:
chrault@hotmail.com. web-site: http://chrault3.free.fr (corresponding author).
‡LEO-Université d’Orléans, e-mail: Anne-Gael.Vaubourg@univ-orleans.fr
1
1 Introduction
For a long time, the diversity of unemployment rates among countries has fuelled the debate
concerning the role of labour market institutions. A rich literature has developed, depicting
strong labour legislation, unemployment protection, wage taxation and union action as sources
of rigidity. In general, they are thought to lead to a low equilibrium rate of employment (Nickell
(1997), Siebert (1997) and Layard & Nickell (1999))1.
This literature has recently been reinforced by studies on the interactions between institu-
tional arrangements within labour markets. For instance, Nickell, Nunziata, Ochel & Quintini
(2002) show that the harmful effect of the gross replacement rate on unemployment is amplified
when the duration of unemployment benefit is long. Similarly, Nickell, Nunziata & Ochel (2005)
argue that the tax wedge increases unemployment all the more when the degree of coordination
in wage bargaining is high. In a similar vein, the literature on institutional complementarities
and substitutability has devoted special attention to the interactions between labour market
institutions (notably employment protection legislation or union density) and product market
regulations2.
Labour and product market institutions are not the only factors determining unemployment.
The empirical literature on ’growth and finance’ shows that investment and growth are strongly
related to financial development3. It is also well known that the size of financial markets, the role
of financial intermediation, the degree of banking concentration etc. differ dramatically among
countries (Allen & Gale (1995, 2000)). This has given rise to an abundant literature on the
opposition between bank-based and marked-based financial systems. This literature investigates
the respective virtues of banks and financial markets in terms of a reduction of information
asymmetry and corporate financing. While banks allow to finance small and risky businesses
as well as firms with lesser reputation and intangible assets, arm’s length financing (through
financial markets or multiple banking relationships) is more suitable for large and creditworthy
firms, with solid reputation and tangible assets (Berlin & Loeys (1988), Diamond (1991), Berlin
& Mester (1992) and Rajan (1992)).
These issues are all the more interesting considering recent developments within the politi-
cal economy literature, which stress the interdependence between labour and financial market
devices. According to Pagano & Volpin (2005), finance and labour contribute jointly to design
the opposition between the so-called corporatist and non-corporatist economies. Contrary to the
latter, corporatist economies are characterized by a proportional (rather than majority) voting
system, weak shareholder protection as well as strong employment protection. In a similar vein,
some contributions suggest that the emergence of bank-based finance and tight labour regulation
1For a survey of the literature on the links between labour market institutions and employment performances,
see Arpai & Mourre (2005).
2The theoretical aspects of this literature are explored by Blanchard & Giavazzi (2003), Hebell & Haefke
(2003), Amable & Gatti (2004) and Amable & Gatti (2006). Empirical analysis have been advanced by Nicoletti
& Scarpetta (2005), Griffith, Harrison & Macartney (2006), Berger & Danninger (2007), Amable, Demmou &
Gatti (2010), Fiori, Nicoletti, Scarpetta & Schiantarelli (2007) and Kugler & Pica (2008).
3See, among others, Levine & Zervos (1998), Beck & Levine (2002), Beck, Levine & Loayza (2002), Carlin &
Mayer (2003) and Djankov (2008).
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are both associated with civil law rather than with common-law (Egrungor (2004), Botero et al.
(2005)) as well as with concentrated financial wealth (Perroti & Von Thadden (2006)). Taken
together, these arguments suggest that a correlation might exist between tight institutions on
labour and financial markets.
The theoretical literature has recently emphasized the idea that the interactions between
labour and financial market institutions may have important consequences for aggregate employ-
ment. In fact, financial market imperfections create a bias in decisions concerning the creation
of firms, job vacancies etc. According to ths literature, the sign and extent of the bias would
depend on the structure of the labour market (Rendon (2001), Belke & Fehn (2002), Koskela
& Stenbacka (2002) and Wasmer & Weil (2004)). Nevertheless empirical studies addressing the
issue are infrequent. A few empirical papers focus on the determinants of labour demand and
provide evidence on the role of financial factors based on micro-data (Nickell & Wadhwani (1991),
Sharpe (1994), Nickell & Nicolitsas (1999), Belke & Fehn (2002), Belke, Fehn & Foster (2004),
Caggese & Cunat (2008) and Benito & Hernando (2008)). However, empirical contributions
adressing the macroeconomic effects of interactions between institutions on labour and financial
markets and focusing on aggregate employment are missing. The goal of this paper is therefore
to fill this gap.
We make here use of an annual data set for 18 OECD countries over the period 1980-2004
to investigate how labour and financial market features jointly affect the unemployment rate,
and implement recently developed dynamic panel data methods. Specifically, we carry out the
system Generalized Moment Method (GMM) estimator developed by Arellano & Bover (1995),
Blundel & Bond (1998) to estimates a dynamic model that includes country fixed effects and
interaction terms in order to capture the interdependence across several institutional devices on
labour and financial markets. Our primary goal here is to check whether financial factors matter
in determining unemployment. Second, we aim to understand whether the effects of financial
arrangements depend on the labour market context, as the theoretical literature suggests. Fi-
nally, we investigate whether the empirical evidence on employment can be interpreted in the
light of the distinction frequently made between market-based and bank-based finance.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the theoretical and empirical background
for our research. Data, econometric methodology and results are presented in Section 3. In order
to ensure that our results are robust to modifications in our estimated model, we consider several
financial market indicators and alternative labour market characteristics. Section 4 provides
additional robustness checks and discusses the policy consequences of our analysis. Section 5
offers some concluding remarks.
2 Theoretical and empirical background
The rationale for our analysis lies at the intersection of two streams of the literature. The
first one deals with the financial determinants of labour demand. The second one refers to the
interactions between financial and labour market institutions.
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2.1 Financial determinants of labour demand
According to the new-Keynesian view, market imperfections (such as adjustment costs and
information asymmetries) play a crucial role in business fluctuations. This explains why firms’
labour demand depends on financial factors. Greenwald & Stiglitz (1993) and Arnold (2002)
show that financial constraints induced by information asymmetries make firms’ labour demand
dependent on their balance-sheet position. As a consequence, employment fluctuates according
to the financial pressures that firms face.
Relatively few empirical studies have been devoted to the financial determinants of labour
demand4. Existing papers are mainly based on firm-level econometric investigations. Sharpe
(1994) find that the sensitivity of American firms’ labour demand to sales increases with their
leverage ratio. Using a set of British firms, Nickell & Wadhwani (1991) show that employment
decreases with firms’ leverage ratio and increases with their market capitalization. Nickell &
Nicolitsas (1999) establish that employment falls with the ratio of interest payment to cash-
flow. Benito & Hernando (2008) obtain the same outcome for Spanish firms. Caggese & Cunat
(2008) establish that financial constraints affect firms’ employment policy and the mix between
permanent and temporary employment.
Other studies examine how financial factors affect employment through their impact on
firms’ creation. According to Acemoglu (2001), financial constraint harms employment because
it hinders the emergence of new innovating firms, which create jobs. He observes that, since the
60’s, the employment rates of firms dependent on external finance has been higher in Europe than
in the United States, arguing that this is due to the stronger regulation of European financial
systems. Finally, Belke & Fehn (2002), Fechs & Fuchs (2003) and Belke & al. (2004) focus
on venture capital. Resorting to theoretical formalizations and empirical investigations using
macroeconomic data, they show that an insufficient development of venture capital prevents the
emergence of new firms, thus penalizing employment.
2.2 Interactions between financial and labour markets regulation
An important theoretical debate within the economic literature concerns the sign and effects
of interactions between financial arrangements and labour market institutions.
A first stream of literature focuses on the common determinants of financial arrangements
and labour market institutions. On the one hand, Egrungor (2004) suggests that the opposition
between bank-based and market-based finance is linked to a country’s legal origins. Whereas
banks act as effective contract enforcers in response to the rigidity of civil law-based economies,
financial markets emerge in common law-based countries, where rules are enforced by legal in-
stitutions. On the other hand, Botero et al. (2005) and Pagano & Volpin (2005) argue that
the regulation of labour is generally more stringent in countries with proportional electoral sys-
tems; these systems are also associated with weak shareholders protection and financial markets
4The financial determinants of capital demand and the sensitivity of investment to cash-flow have received
much more attention. On this issue, see the seminal papers by Fazzari, Hubbard & Petersen (1988), Gertler &
Gilchrist (1994) and Bond & Meghir (1994).
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development. Taken together, these arguments establish an objective link between finance and
labour market institutions. Countries who have inherited civil law legal systems should associate
bank dominance with tight labour market regulation while common law countries should exhibit
highly developed financial markets and flexible labour market regulation. Using a theoretical
model where financial structure and labour market regulation are determined by the distribution
of financial wealth, Perroti & Von Thadden (2006) reach the same conclusion. They show that
economies exhibiting diffused financial wealth are characterized by highly developed financial
markets and weak worker protection while economies with concentrated financial wealth should
feature bank-based financial systems and strong labour regulation.
Another series of contributions investigates the implications of the interactions between fi-
nancial arrangements and labour market institutions on unemployment. In a first set of papers,
financial deregulation and labour market flexibilization are regarded as substitutes. In Rendon
(2001), the removal of firing and hiring costs favours employment. Financial development also
promotes job creation since it allows firms to finance labour adjustment costs by security is-
suance. As their hiring policy becomes less dependent on their internal resources, firms adjust
their employment level more rapidly. Therefore, if financial development is high, the removal of
labour market adjustment costs loses its effectiveness since costs can be financed by the issuance
of securities. Symmetrically, if the labour market is made perfectly flexible, the access to external
finance has less of an impact on employment. In Belke & Fehn (2002), a strong labour protec-
tion allows workers to partly capture the rent stemming from the entrepreneur’s project. This
decreases the project’s rate of return below the minimum threshold defined by funders. Hence,
the firm can not emerge and no labour is hired, thus generating unemployment. However, the
rise in unemployment yields a decline in labour protection and a subsequent rise in the project’s
return above the founders’ threshold. Nevertheless, if the firm is financially constrained, the
adjustment is slower and the return to higher employment is delayed. When the labour market
is flexible, there is no unemployment and financial deregulation becomes useless. When the
financial system is frictionless, the return to employment is immediate and the deregulation of
labour market loses interest.
In a second set of papers, financial deregulation and labour market flexibility are seen as
complementary. Wasmer & Weil (2004) provide a thoeretical model where the liberalization of
labour and/or financial markets improves markets liquidity and reduces agents’ matching costs:
firms and workers match more easily on the labour market, as well as firms and banks on the
credit market. This yields positive effects on employment. Koskela & Stenbacka (2002) model
the effects of a reduction of bank competition in an economy where workers are remunerated by
a bargained base wage and a share of firms’ profit. Because the firms’ hiring policy is financed by
borrowing, an increase in the interest rate implied by a reduction of banking competition hinders
employment. But workers internalize the rise in hiring costs and bargain less harshly concerning
their base wage. The moderating effect dominates when unions are powerful. Otherwise, the
former effect prevails. Hence, the introduction of imperfections in the banking sector curbs
the negative impact of labour market frictions. In other words, financial deregulation favours
employment only if the labour market is very flexible. Deregulation becomes counter-productive
if the labour market is highly regulated. Labour and financial market institutions are also seen as
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complementary in the literature on human capital investment. Acemoglu & Pischke (1999) show
that tight labour market institutions and credit rationing favour firms’ investment in human
capital yielding improvements in labour productivity. This result suggests that deregulation
on both labour and financial markets may trigger productivity losses and adverse effects on
employment. Unfortunately, this aspect is not formally addressed in existing theoretical models.
3 Econometric investigation
The theoretical literature reviewed in the previous section suggests that financial factors
matter in determining unemployment. Moreover, the effects of financial arrangements may
depend on the structure of the labour market. In this respect, the distinction between market-
based and bank-based finance appears crucial.
In this section, we turn to the econometric analysis and outline in the first two sub-sections
the details of the empirical model considered, as well as the data used, and the econometric
methodology. Main econometric results are discussed in the last sub-section and tables of results
are provided in Appendix 3 and 4.
3.1 Data and econometric model
Our panel includes annual data for 18 OECD countries (Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal,
Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom and United States) and covers the period 1980-2004. We con-
sider a time-series cross-sectional model that includes country fixed effects as well as a few inter-
action terms allowing us to investigate the interdependence across several institutional devices.
The general specification of our empirical model is as follows:
Ui,t = αi+υt+β ·Ui,t−1+χ ·LABOURi,t+δ ·FINi,t+γ ·LABOURi,t ·FINi,t+φ ·CVi,t+i,t (1)
, where αi is the country i fixed effect, υt the time specific effect, Ui,t the standardized rate of
unemployment obtained from the OECD, Ui,t−1 the lagged rate of unemployment, capturing
the inertia in the unemployment dynamics, and i,t the disturbance term assumed to follow the
standard assumptions.
The model features a number of regressors capturing the institutional and macroeconomic
characteristics of the investigated economies. Recent studies have underlined problems related to
the inclusion of time-invariant variables within fixed-effect models (Amable, Demmou & Gatti
(2010)). To avoid those problems, we pay particular attention to the institutional variables
included in our regressions. Time-series institutional variables (instead of time-invariant indic-
ators) are preferred whenever they are available.
LABOURi,t is a set of 3 variables accounting for labour market institutions. LMREGi,t is
the measure of employment protection legislation built by Amable, Demmou & Gatti (2010)5.
5This time-series indicator is based on EPL (Employment Protection Legislation) scores provided by Nickell,
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Contrary to the standard OECD indicator, LMREGi,t is a time-series variable between 0 (for
the lowest level of employment protection) to 3 (for the highest level of protection). COORDi,t
evaluates the degree of coordination in wage bargaining. Taken from Nickell, Nunziata & Ochel
(2005), this variable ranges from 0 to 3 with higher scores corresponding to higher coordination.
UNIONi,t is the degree of union density, calculated by the OECD as the proportion of union
members among workers.
FINi,t denotes a set of three financial indicators. Currently used in the finance and growth
literature, they come from the Demircu¨c¸-Kunt & Levine (2001) data set. CAPIi,t is a ratio of
stock market capitalisation to GDP. CREDITi,t is a ratio of the claims to the private sector by
financial intermediaries (deposit money banks, insurance companies, private pensions, pooled
investment schemes and development banks) to GDP. Both variables capture the effect of finan-
cial constraint on unemployment, as described in Rendon (2001), Acemoglu (2001) and Belke
& Fehn (2002)6. However, the two variables can be included in the regressions simultaneously
since, as explained above, intermediated and arm’s length finance constitute alternative funding
channels. CONCi,t, which is the ratio of the three largest banks’ asset to total banking sector
assets, evaluates the concentration of the banking sector. In the theoretical literature on finan-
cial intermediation, high banking concentration is closely associated with intermediated finance
since high interest rates increase banks’ incentive to produce private information on borrowers.
Conversely, when concentration in the banking sector is low, banks behave more as arms’ length
lenders. This measure, suggested by Koskela & Stenbacka (2002), is only available over the pe-
riod 1980-2004. Therefore, when CONCi,t is included in the model, the number of observations
is reduced.
CVi,t is a set of seven control variables, all provided by the OECD. In reference to the literature
on the institutional determinants of unemployment, we include WEDGEi,t and REPLACEi,t
(the tax wedge and the replacement rate for unemployment benefit respectively) as well as
PMREGi,t, an indicator of regulatory reform on product markets. PMREGi,t is based on the
REGREFF indicator from the OECD database and summarizes regulatory provisions in seven
non-manufacturing sectors: telecom, electricity, gas, post, rail, air passenger transport, and road
freight. The indicator, which has been estimated by OECD over the period 1975 to 2003, ranges
from 0 (for the lowest level of regulation) to 6 (for the highest level of regulation). The fourth
control variable, EXCHANGEi,t, is the real exchange rate. It accounts for the competitiveness
of national products. The fifth control variable is, RATE, the short-term interest rate. The
sixth, GDPi,t, stands for the GDP per employee. Finally, the last control variable is CY CLEi,t,
the ratio of the flow of credit in the economy to GDP, which accounts for the impact of the
Nunziata & Ochel (2005) as well as on measures of structural reforms obtained from the FRDB Database. We use
the following variables from FRDB database: the number of reforms passed each year in each country, whether
they are directed towards more flexibility (by decreasing restrictions in domains such as wage setting, firing
restriction, working time regulation etc.) as well as whether they apply to all, or a large majority of professional
categories, contract typologies etc.
6Following the empirical studies by Belke & Fehn (2002), Belke & al. (2004) and Fechs & Fuchs (2003), we
could have also considered the level of venture capital financing. But many venture capital data are missing for
the period and the countries covered by our panel.
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credit cycle7.
The list of dependent and independent variables described above is reported in Table 1.1 in
Appendix 1. Table 1.2, also included in Appendix 1, provides summary statistics for each of
them.
3.2 Econometric Methodology
The most common panel data econometric techniques for estimating an equation like (1)
are OLS, Between, Within, or MCG. However, it should be emphasised that the estimates of the
coefficients of equation (1) obtained with such techniques can be biased for a variety of reasons,
among them measurement error, reverse causation and omitted variable bias. Therefore, a
suitable estimation method should be used in order to obtain unbiased, consistent and efficient
estimates of these coefficients. To deal with these biases, researchers have utilised dynamic
panel regressions with lagged values of the explanatory endogenous variables as instruments.
Such methods have several advantages over cross-sectional instrumental variable regressions. In
particular, they control for endogeneity and measurement error not only of the lag standardized
rate of unemployment variable, but also of other explanatory variables. Note also that, in the
case of cross-section regressions, the lagged dependent variable is correlated with the error term
if it is not instrumented.
In our analysis, we employ the system GMM estimator developed by Arellano & Bover (1995),
which combines a regression in differences with one in levels (see Appendix 2 for further details).
Blundel & Bond (1998) present Monte Carlo evidence that the inclusion of the level regression
in the estimation reduces the potential bias in finite samples and the asymptotic inaccuracy
associated with the difference estimator. The consistency of the GMM estimator depends on the
validity of the instruments used in the model as well as the assumption that the error term does
not exhibit serial correlation. In our case, the instruments are chosen from the lagged endogenous
and explanatory variables. In order to test the validity of the selected instruments, we perform
the Hansen-Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions proposed by Arellano & Bond (1991). In
addition, we also check for the presence of any residual autocorrelation. Finally, we perform
stationarity and unit-root tests belonging to the first-(Hadri (2000), Im, Pesaran & Shin (2003))
and second-generation stationarity and unit root test (Harry, Leybourne & MacCabe (2005),
Pesaran (2007)). The results suggest that all series are stationary (see Tables 3.1 to 3.10 in
Appendix 3), and consequently no co-integration analysis is necessary8.Therefore we proceed
7CREDITi,t is a stock variable that accounts for the structural aspects of the financial system whereas
CY CLEi,t is a flow variable that captures conjonctural effects.
8A common feature of the panel unit root tests by Im & al. (2003) and Pesaran (2007) is that they maintained
the null hypothesis of a unit root in all panel members. Therefore, rejecting their null does not provide compelling
evidence about stationarity of all panel members (as it is sometimes assumed), but only indicates that at least
one panel member is stationary, with no information about how many series or which ones are stationary. This
possibility for a mixed panel implies that some of the members may be stationary while others may be non-
stationary (see e.g Taylor & Sarno (1998) and Taylor & Taylor (2004) for further details in the context of
the PPP debate). On the contrary, the panel stationarity tests by Hadri (2000) and Harry & al. (2005) test
joint stationarity of the individual series under the null. And consequently, a failure to reject their null can be
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directly to the GMM estimation.
It is worth noting that Equation (1) includes several interaction terms allowing us to capture
the interdependence between financial and labour market devices. Therefore after estimating
this equation, we examine whether the consequences of financial market arrangements depend
on the regulatory environment on the labour market, and vice versa. STATA also allows to
evaluate the effects of each relevant variable for different levels of the interacted variables. This
amounts to calculating the marginal effects of each variable, as well as all statistics concerning
the significance of those marginal effects. In the presence of interaction terms, the overall impact
of LABOUR and FIN indicators on unemployment equals the marginal effect conditional on
specific values of the interacted variables. From model (1), one has:
∂U
∂LABOUR
= χ+ γ · F˜ IN (2)
∂U
∂FIN
= δ + γ · ˜LABOUR
,where F˜ IN and ˜LABOUR correspond to specific levels of labour and financial indicators that
have been selected to give a clear picture of the importance and evolution of marginal coefficients.
The specific levels that we have retained are minimum value, mean value minus one standard
error, mean, mean plus one standard error and maximum value.
3.3 Estimation results
As we have seen, the theoretical literature on unemployment determinants generally focuses
on the degree of rigidity of labour market institutions in relation to financial characteristics.
Hence, in the first place we restrict our attention to labour market variables capturing the
rigidity of labour regulation, that is UNION and LMREG9. To ensure that our results are
robust, we consider several variants of our empirical model. We proceed as follows: leaving the
specification with the two labour regulation variables (UNION and LMREG) and the seven
control variables unchanged, we consider our financial variables one by one. We subsequently
estimate an encompassing model including all labour and financial indicators. Doing this, we pay
particular attention to the interaction terms included in our regressions. Considering interactions
with one labour market variable at a time allows us to check for the robustness of the estimated
coefficients across alternative specifications. We are thus able to make sure that the signs of
those coefficients are not too sensitive to changes in the interacted variables.
Before turning to regressions, we test for the pooling restrictions implicit in equation (1) and
investigate whether key parameters of this equation are equal across countries, implying that
interpreted unambiguously as evidence for stationnaity holding in the entire panel. The results of these last two
tests are available upon request and confirm that all series are stationary. We think that a combination of these
stationarity and unit-root tests might reassure the reader in the sense that they provide strong support that these
series are stationary and the research can proceed to the GMM estimation.
9However, in the next section we will add one additional labour market dimension by taking the impact of
wage coordination into account.
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pooling time series and cross-sectional data is appropriate in our context. Specifically, we employ
a multi-step procedure to test pooling restrictions in our system of 18 OECD members where
hypotheses of interest are tested by means of a likelihood-ratio (L-R) statistic. This procedure
is in the same spirit than the approach proposed by Hsiao (1986). Our results (available upon
resquest) indicate that common coefficients can be assumed across countries and therefore pool-
ing time series and cross sectional data appears to be convenient here. Besides the fixed effect
specification turns out to be the more adequate in our framework.
The econometric results of the dynamic panel regressions of equation (1) by the system GMM
estimator are reported in Table 4.1 (see Appendix 4) whereas Table 4.2 shows the marginal
coefficients of LABOUR and FIN indicators for given levels of the interacted variables. In
Table 4.1 (columns [1]-[2]), we present results for a specification including CAPI (ratio of stock
market development to GDP) as a unique financial indicator. In columns [3]-[4] we consider
CREDIT (ratio of the claims to the private sector by financial intermediaries to GDP), while
in columns [5]-[6] we investigate the effects of CONC (concentration of the banking sector).
For each of the above specifications, we interact our selected financial indicator with one labour
market variable at a time (LMREG or UNION). Finally, columns [7]-[8] present the regression
results based on the encompassing model featuring all financial indicators together. Once again,
we interact those indicators with LMREG (column [7]) or UNION (column [8]) alternatively.
We comment on our results on labour market and control variables below. We then analyse the
econometric evidence concerning the financial factors.
Table 4.2 reports marginal coefficients estimated by STATA on the basis of regression results
presented in Table 4.1. Column [1] in Part A of Table 4.2 provides marginal coefficients for
the CAPI indicator corresponding to five different levels of the interacted labour variable (i.e.
LMREG) as specified in column [1] of Table 4.1. Symmetrically, column [1] in Part B of Table
4.2 reports the marginal coefficients of the LMREG variable for given levels of the interacted
financial indicator (i.e. CAPI). We apply the same procedure to all other columns of Table
4.2. However, one should note that no marginal coefficient can be calculated for labour market
variables (specifications [7]-[8] in Part B of Table 4.2). The reason is that those variants of
the model include three interactions terms for each labour indicator. Hence, we cannot isolate
pertinent reference values of interacted variables enabling us to calculate marginal coefficients
properly. Nevertheless, we can calculate the marginal coefficients for the financial variables.
These coefficients are presented in columns [7]-[8], Part A of Table 4.2. Before commenting
on these results, it is worth noting that our GMM model specifications pass all the standard
diagnostic tests, whose P-values are given in the three last lines of Table 4.1. In particular, there
is no evidence of residual autocorrelation or order two, and the validity of the instruments is
always confirmed by Hansen-Sargan’s test.
To start with, one should note that the coefficient of the lagged rate of unemployment is
highly significant and positive in all regressions, highlighting a strong inertia in the evolution of
employment performances. The coefficients for control variables are not systematically significant
across all specifications. However, when they appear significant, they have the expected sign. The
coefficients of EXCHANGE (columns [1]-[2]-[4] and [8]) and CY CLE (in all columns except
[3]-[7]) are negative. Hence, as expected, we find that increased competitiveness and credit
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flow generally imply lower unemployment. Moreover, as expected, we find that an increase
in the tax wedge raises unemployment (variants [3]-[6] and [7]). The same result holds for
stronger product market regulation (specifications [4]-[5]-[6]) and for higher short-term interest
rate (variant [4]). The coefficient for GDP is never significant (except in specification [4], in
which it is negative). This suggests that the expected positive impact of high productivity
on labour demand and employment is balanced by the exclusion of low skilled workers from
the labour market. Finally, as in other empirical contributions (Nickell (1997), Fiori, Nicoletti,
Scarpetta & Schiantarelli (2007), Baccaro & Rei (2007) and Amable & al. (2010)), the coefficient
on the replacement rate is generally insignificant.
Turning to the impact of labour market variables, our results indicate that changing labour
markets’ structure has contrasted effects on unemployment. On the one hand, we find that union
density has no effect on unemployment. On the other hand, with the exception of specifications
[1]-[2], we find an insignificant coefficient for labour market regulation. This result is in line
with Nickell (1997), Layard & Nickell (1999), Belot & Ours (2001), Nickell, Nunziata & Ochel
(2005), Fiori, Nicoletti, Scarpetta & Schiantarelli (2007), Baccaro & Rei (2007) and Amable &
al. (2010). However, when the coefficient of LMREG appears significant (in columns [1]-[2]),
it is negative, which means that increased job protection contributes to lower unemployment.
Moreover, marginal coefficients given in Part B of Table 4.2 (column [1]) are significant and
negative for values of CAPI below (or equal to) the mean level. This result is in line with
Acemoglu & Pischke (1999)’s view that combining labour market regulation and tight financial
constraint brings positive effects on employment.
Let us now focus on results concerning financial indicators. Our findings globally support the
idea that unemployment has financial determinants and that these determinants interact with
labour market institutions.
Regressions [1]-[2] and [7]-[8] investigate the consequences of increased market capitalization
(variable CAPI). This variable appears to promote employment: the coefficients of CAPI is
negative and significant in specifications [1] and [2]. This result is consistent with conclusions
from the theoretical literature, suggesting that financial market development has a positive
bearing on employment in terms of released financial constraints. It also confirms Nickell &
Wadhwani (1991)’s result that increased market capitalization has a positive impact on firms’
labour demand. The result is partially confirmed by the analysis of the marginal effects of
CAPI, provided in Part A of Table 4.2. Variants [1]-[2] indicate that increased CAPI reduces
unemployment if the labour market is weakly regulated (i.e. if the degree on labour regulation
is lower than the means level) and weakly unionized (i.e. if the degree of union density is not
higher than the means level). It has no significant effects otherwise.
If the CAPI variable measures the size and importance of financial markets, the alternative
CREDIT indicator allows us to investigate the effects of intermediated credit. In columns [3]-[4]
and [7]-[8] of Table 4.1, we find no significant effects of CREDIT on employment. However,
looking at the sign and significance of marginal coefficients presented in Part A of Table 4.2 (vari-
ant [4]), we find that intermediated credit reduces unemployment if the level of union density is
very high (i.e. at its maximum level). This result can be interpreted according to the theoret-
ical literature on the interactions between labour and financial markets factors: when workers
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are well-protected by unions, firms are pushed to increase their productivity and monitoring
by financial intermediaries becomes profitable, thus making intermediated credit favourable to
employment.
Finally, we turn to the consequences of increased banking concentration (variable CONC).
As already noted, this variable has been available for a shorter period of time, so that the number
of observations is more limited. Nevertheless, the results presented in Table 4.1 (variants [5]-[6])
suggest that concentration in the banking sector has a negative direct effect on employment. The
interaction terms are also generally significant. Our results are better understood by looking at
the marginal effects presented in Table 4.2. Results provided in column [5] show that increased
CONC harms employment if the labour market is weakly regulated (i.e. when the level of labour
regulation is equal to its minimum level) while it favours employment when the labour market
is highly regulated (i.e. when the level of labour regulation is equal to its maximum level).
Moreover, banking concentration increases unemployment when union density is very low, i.e.
equal to its minimum level (column [6]). In all other cases, CONC has no significant impact. The
effect of banking concentration turns out to be particularly robust since the marginal coefficients
of CONC remain significant when all financial variables and corresponding interaction terms
are included in the estimation (columns [7]-[8]). As suggested by the theoretical literature, the
rationale of these results is that two opposite mechanisms are at play. On the one hand, high
interest rates associated with low banking competition hinder employment. On the other hand,
organized workers internalize the rise in hiring costs and bargain less harshly concerning their
base wage. This moderating effect is stronger when unions are powerful and workers are more
protected.
Taken together, these results suggest that intermediated finance (i.e. increased intermediated
credit and increased banking concentration) plays an alternative role with respect to arm’s length
finance (i.e. increased market capitalisation and decreased banking concentration).
When labour market regulation and union density are low, an increase in arm’s length finance
(i.e. increased market capitalization and reduced banking concentration) yields positive effects
on employment. However, when labour market regulation and union density are high, the
positive impact of market capitalisation is less robust. In this case, employment can be raised
by strengthening banking concentration (if labour market regulation is tight) or by increasing
intermediated credit (if union density is high).
This provides the first evidence showing a trade-off between intermediated finance and arm’s
length finance in promoting employment, and that this trade-off is mediated by the labour market
structure. Hence, our results indicate that the effects of financial variables on unemployment
are dependent on the labour markets context. However, it is important to note that these
interdependence are not symmetric since the impact of labour market institutions appears largely
independent of the features of financial markets.
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4 Extentions
In this section, we presents two extentions to our empirical analysis. First, we check for
the robustness of empirical results by running regressions including wage coordination as an
alternative labour market device. Second, we analyse the policy implications of our empirical
evidence.
4.1 Robustness check: wage coordination
Many empirical contributions have shown that the degree of coordination in wage bargaining
is an important determinant of unemployment. Moreover, wage coordination is admittedly
one crucial factor shaping the distinction between corporatist and non-corporatist countries
(Calmsfors & Driffill (1988)). This section aims to check whether coordination still matters, when
considered in interaction with financial variables. Hence, we introduce the variable COORD in
all our regression specifications. Results are presented in Tables 4.3 and 4.4 in Appendix 4.
Table 4.3 reports regressions coefficients for four variants of the empirical model: in columns
[1] to [3] we interact the labour market variable COORD with each financial factor in turn.
Column [4] presents the results from the comprehensive model including all financial indicators
and interaction terms. In Table 4.4, we provide marginal coefficients’ values and statistics relative
to the four specifications of the empirical model. As in the previous section, we are unable to
compute sensible marginal coefficients for COORD in variant [4], since the size of the marginal
effect depends on the interactions of three different variables.
As in Table 4.1, the specification tests of Hansen-Sargan and Arellano & Bover (1995) respec-
tively suggest that the model is correctly specified (see bottom of Tables 4.3). From Table 4.3
one can also see that the regression results are consistent with those presented in the previous
section, concerning the control and labour market variables, in particular. Concerning the wage
coordination variable COORD, we generally observe no significant effects on employment. This
suggests that coordination does not contribute to wage moderation, contrary to the current view
(Calmsfors & Driffill (1988)). However, in variant [4], the coefficient for COORD is positive.
This result is in the line with evidence provided by Fiori, Nicoletti, Scarpetta & Schiantarelli
(2007) and Baccaro & Rei (2007). As explained by the authors, low coordination yields low
bargaining power for workers, which may allow firms to avoid an excessive rise in wages.
Turning to financial variables, our regression results show that the degree of wage coordi-
nation is not neutral with respect to the way financial determinants affect unemployment. In
particular, the marginal coefficients presented in Part A of Table 4.4 suggest that, for degrees of
coordination below (or equal to) the mean level, stronger market capitalization favours a decrease
in unemployment (specification [1]). CAPI has no significant effect otherwise. Moreover, an
increase in banking concentration contributes to reduce unemployment for the highest degree of
coordination (specification [3]). Here again, this effect appears robust since marginal coefficients
remain significant when considering all financial variables and interaction terms simultaneously
(variant [4]). Compared with findings reported in Tables 4.1 and 4.2, these results indicate that
the wage coordination variable behaves as the labour regulation indicator. This is consistent
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with the view that wage bargaining coordination works as a form of labour protection rather
than as a device ensuring real wage moderation.
More generally, the evidence presented in Tables 4.3 and Table 4.4 confirms our previous
findings: boosting financial markets appear to effectively reduce unemployment, as long as the
labour market has a weakly coordinated structure. However, with highly coordinated labour
markets, increasing banking concentration becomes a more appropriate tool for reducing unem-
ployment. This supports the existence of a trade-off between intermediated and market-based
finance in promoting employment, which is mediated by the labour market structure.
4.2 Policy implications
Our empirical evidence indicates that the effects of financial variables on unemployment
are significant and depend on the labour markets structure. Regression results suggest that
the respective virtues of bank-based and market-based finance are crucially tied to the nature
and strength of labour regulation. Arm’s length finance (through increased capitalisation, as
well as through lesser banking concentration) is advantageous in terms of employment in the
presence of low levels of labour market regulation, union density and wage coordination. Higher
intermediated finance (through increased intermediated credit and higher banking concentration)
appears to be beneficial for employment in the presence of high levels of labour regulation,
union density and wage coordination. These results provide evidence supporting the idea that
a correlation exists betweeen tight institutional devices on labour and financial markets (Rajan
& Zingales (1995), Egrungor (2004), Botero et al. (2005)).
In this section, we tackle the issue of the importance and size of the ’real’ effects of finance.
Based on our regression results, we present a few examples evaluating the employment conse-
quences associated with given changes in financial indicators.
Let us first consider the marginal coefficients presented in Table 4.2. Those coefficients
indicate that financial variables have sizeable effects on unemployment. Increasing market cap-
italization by 1% yields a decrease in the unemployment rate comprised between 1.56 - 1.70%,
depending on the level of labour regulation (column [1]). The impact of market capitalization
is of the same order when one considers high degrees of unionization (column [2]). Hence, lower
capitalization of financial markets can lead to substantial employment losses. As a consequence,
providing conditions for an increasing market capitalization (with respect to GDP) is one rel-
evant policy recommandation in countries with low labour regulation. Intermediated finance
(CREDIT ) also brings significant effects on unemployment: increasing credit intermediation by
one 1% reduces unemployment by 2.83% when considering highest levels of union density (col-
umn [4]). As a consequence, a decrease in intermediated credit can yield an important decline in
employment in countries with high union density. Concerning the effect of CONC, column [5]
indicates that increasing concentration by 1% pushes employment up by 3.07% (for the lowest
level of labour regulation) or reduces it by 6.77% (for the highest level of regulation). In this case,
strong regulation makes the effects of banking concentration favourable to employment while low
regulation makes it harmfull. Hence, highly regulated countries are well-advised to implement
policies that aim to increase banking concentration. Conversely, countries with relatively low
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regulation are put under greater pressure following a decrease in banking concentration. Similar
results can be obtained concerning the marginal coefficients presented in Table 4.4. These results
suggest that financial turmoils may have significant real effects on employment.
We also investigate how changes in financial variables impact unemployment in each country
of our dataset. We compute simulations on the basis of the encompassing model, presented in
Table 4.1 (columns [7] and [8]) and Table 4.3 (column [4]). We select one of the three financial
variables (CAPI, CREDIT or CONC) and, for each year, we set it equal to its ’high level’,
defined as its observed level plus one standard deviation. The labour variable and the two other
financial variables are kept equal to their observed value. Using our econometric estimates of the
encompassing model, we compute the rate of unemployment compatible with the ’high level’ of
the selected financial variable. We then compare the value of the estimated unemployment rate
with the observed unemployment rate.
Figures 1 and 2, in Appendix 5, are two interesting examples of simulations. In Figure
1, the selected financial variable (set equal to its ’high level’) is CONC and the interaction
labour variable is UNION while in Figure 2, the selected financial variable is CONC and
the interaction labour variable is COORD10. In Figure 1, the predicted unemployment rate is
higher than the observed unemployment rate for many coutries in which the degree of union
density is particularly low (the United States, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, France,
Germany, Canada). Conversely, the estimated unemployment rate is lower than the observed
unemployment rate in countries with high union density such as Denmark, Norway, Sweden and
Portugal for example. This suggests that in countries where the degree of union density is high,
employment performance would have been improved with less competition in the banking sector.
In Figure 2, a high level of banking concentration reduces the unemployment rate compared to
its observed level in Belgium, France, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway and Spain notably
while raising it in Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States. This supports the
view that reducing competition in the banking sector is a relevant policy when the degree of
coordination is high whereas it worsens employment when wage bargaining is weakly coordinated.
5 Conclusion
The aim of this paper was to examine how financial market arrangements interact with
labour regulation to determine unemployment by estimating a dynamic panel data model using
GMM techniques over the period 1980-2004. Indeed, such techniques provide solutions to the
problems of simultaneity bias, reverse causality and omitted variables, and also allow to control
for individual specific effects and time effects, as well as to overcome the endogeneity bias. Our
econometric estimates show that the development of arms’ length finance (through increased
capitalization and lower banking concentration) favours employment in the presence of low lev-
els of labour market regulation, union density and wage bargaining coordination. At the same
time, improved intermediated finance (through increased intermediated credit and higher bank-
10As the variable CONC is missing for almost all years in the case of Finland, Figure 1 and Figure 2 do not
provide simulations for this country.
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ing concentration) is beneficial for employment in the presence of high levels of labour market
regulation, union density and wage coordination.
Our findings suggest that financial variables impact unemployment in a way that crucially
depends on the labour market context. In the presence of weakly regulated, unionized and coor-
dinated labour markets, policies boosting market-based finance prove to be effective in enhancing
employment. However, with strong labour regulation, union density and coordination in wage
bargaining, reducing competition in the banking sector and promoting intermediated credit has
positive consequences on employment. These estimated effects of finance appear to be significant
and sizeable.
Our paper also advocates care in analyzing the effectiveness of changes on financial and labour
markets. The effects of deregulation policies are not linear. For instance, while tightening labour
protection decreases unemployment (for low levels of market capitalization), it also leads to a
new context in which market-based finance has no more effect on employment.
To conclude, we find no evidence corroborating the existence of a simple complementarity (or
substitution) across financial and labour market structures. In fact, our results suggest that a
more complex interdependence exists across financial and labour determinants of unemployment.
This calls for further investigations and opens up a rich research agenda.
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Table 1.2: Statistical summary for variables (1980-2004)
Variables Mean Max Min
U 7.447 19.5 1.5
(3.504)
LMREG 1.140 0.558 0.1
(0.558)
UNION 41.996 87.4 7.4
(21.068)
COORD 2.051 3 1
(0.578)
CAPI 0.492 2.7 0.003
(0.404)
CREDIT 0.878 2.168 0.220
(0.378)
CONC 0.678 1 0.226
(0.203)
WEDGE 28.693 46.962 12.944
(8.081)
REPLACE 0.356 28 0
(1.312)
PMREG 4.033 6 1.108
(1.285)
EXCHANGE 0.002 0.266 -0.203
(0.058)
RATE 5.187 -2.215 17.347
(3.642)
GDP 53 912.02 80 659.9 26 558.71
(9 983.803)
CY CLE 10.13 46.79 -19.17
(7.73)
Nonmissing obs.
441
410
378
403
430
430
432
450
450
448
414
450
450
357
Standard deviations are in parentheses.
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APPENDIX 2: Estimation of a Dynamic Panel Data Model using the Generalized
Method of Moments (GMM)
We use the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator for dynamic panels intro-
duced by Holtz-Eakin, Newey and Rosen (1988), Arellano and Bond (1991), and Arellano and
Bover (1995) in order to investigate how labour and financial factors interact to determine un-
employment. We consider the following equation:
yi,t = yi,t−1 + βXi,t + ui + νt + ei,t (3)
where yi,t denotes the standardized rate of unemployment obtained from the OECD, Xi,t includes
a number of regressors capturing the institutional and macroeconomic characteristics of the
investigated economies (see section 3.1), ui is the individual specific effect, νt the time specific
effect, and ei,t the error term (i is individual index, and t is the time index).
The presence of the lagged dependent variable as an explanatory variable does not allow
the use of standard econometric techniques. The GMM method for dynamic panels provides
solutions to the problems of simultaneity bias, reverse causality and omitted variables. Besides,
it allows one to control for individual specific effects ui, and time effects νt as well as to overcome
the endogeneity bias.
There are two types of GMM estimators for dynamic panels: (i) the first-differenced GMM
estimator (Arellano & Bond (1991)); and (ii) the system GMM estimator (Blundel & Bond
(1998)). The former eliminates specific individual effects through first-differencing of a single
equation, and then instruments the explanatory variables using their lagged values in levels. The
latter involves the estimation of a system containing both first–differenced and levels equations,
where the variables are instrumented by their first differences.
The choice of lagged variables as instruments depends on the nature of the explanatory
variables:
1. For the exogenous variables, their current values are used as instruments;
2. For variables which are either predetermined or influenced by previous values of the
dependent variable, but not correlated with future values of the error term, lagged values for at
least one period can be used as instruments;
3. For endogenous variables, only their lagged values for at least two periods can be used as
valid instruments.
The use of these estimators is based on the assumption of quasi-stationary variables in the
equation in levels, and no autocorrelation of the residuals. To deal with potential omitted
variables bias arising from specific effects, the strategy of Arellano-Bond estimator (1991) is to
take first differences. This implies the following specification:
yi,t − yi,t−1 = α(yi,t−1 − yi,t−2) + β(Xi,t −Xi,t−1) + (νi,t − νi,t−1) + (ei,t − ei,t−1) (4)
By construction, the error term (ei,t− ei,t−1) is correlated with the lagged variable in differences
(yi,t−1 − yi,t−2). The first differences of the explanatory variables of the model are instrumented
through their lagged values (in levels) in order to reduce the simultaneity bias and the bias
resulting from the presence of the lagged dependent variable in differences on the left-hand side.
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Under the assumption that the error terms are not autocorrelated and that the explanatory
variables of the model may be influenced by lagged values, but are uncorrelated with future
values of the error term, the following moment conditions have to be satisfied for the equation
in first differences:
E|yt−s, (ei,t − ei,t−1)| = 0 for s ≥ 2; t = 3, ...T (5)
E|Xt−s, (ei,t − ei,t−1)| = 0 for s ≥ 2; t = 3, ...T (6)
However, this estimator suffers from the ‘weakness’ of its instruments, which entails considerable
bias, especially for small size samples, and therefore its accuracy is asymptotically low. Specif-
ically, the lagged values of the explanatory variables are ‘weak’ instruments for the equation in
first differences: the GMM estimator for the first difference takes into account only the intra-
individuals variations, the inter-individuals variations being removed through the differencing.
The GMM system estimator (that we use in our analysis) eliminates this problem by com-
bining the equation in difference with an equation in levels, i.e. it estimates equation (4) (in
first differences) simultaneously with equation (2) (in levels). In equation (1), the variables are
instrumented using their most recent lags in first differences. Blundell and Bond (1998) tested
this method using Monte Carlo simulations and found that (i) the GMM system estimator is
more efficient than the GMM in differences; and (ii) the GMM in first differences produces bi-
ased coefficients for small samples when the instruments are ‘weak’. For the equation in levels,
the GMM system method uses additional moment conditions assuming that the explanatory
variables are stationary:
E|(yt+s − yt+s−1).(ui + ei,t)| = 0 for s = 1; t = 3, ...T (7)
E|(Xt+s −Xt+s−1).(ui + ei,t)| = 0 for s = 1; t = 3, ...T (8)
Conditions (5) to (8) combined with the GMM method allow one to estimate the coefficients of
model.
The consistency of the GMM Estimator depends on whether lagged values of the explanatory
variables are valid instruments in the regression. We address this issue by considering two
specification tests suggested by Arellano & Bond (1991) and Arellano & Bover (1995). The first
test examines the null hypothesis that the error term ei,t is not serially correlated. The model
specification is supported when the null hypothesis is not rejected. In the system specification,
we test whether the differenced error term (that is, the residual of the regression in differences)
exhibits second-order serial correlation. First-order serial correlation of the differenced error term
is expected even if the original error term (in levels) is uncorrelated, unless the latter follows
a random walk. Second-order serial correlation of the differenced residual indicates that the
original error term is serially correlated and follows a moving average process at least of order
one. This would imply that the proposed instruments are not valid (and that higher-order lags
should be used as instruments). The second tests is the Hansen-Sargan test of over-identifying
restrictions. It tests the overall validity of the instruments by analysing the sample analogue of
the moment conditions used in the estimation process. Failure to reject the null hypothesis gives
support to the model.
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APPENDIX 3: Panel unit root test results
Table 3.1: Summary of Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003) panel unit root test and Hadri (2000) panel
stationarity test for the standardized rate of unemployment (U)
Method Statistic P-value* Cross sections
Null: Unit root for all panel members
Pesaran and Shin W-stat -5.49643 0.0000 18
Null: no unit root in any of the series in the panel
Hadri Z-stat -0.13842 0.5550 18
* The tests assume asymptotic normality. Automatic selection of lags based on SIC. Newey-West bandwidth
selection using a Bartlett kernel
Table 3.2: Summary of Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003) panel unit root test and Hadri (2000) panel
stationarity test for the degree of union density (UNION)
Method Statistic P-value* Cross sections
Null: Unit root for all panel members
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat -8.54382 0.0000 18
Null: no unit root in any of the series in the panel
Hadri Z-stat-0.64937 0.7419 18
* The tests assume asymptotic normality. Automatic selection of lags based on SIC. Newey-West bandwidth
selection using a Bartlett kernel
Table 3.3: Summary of Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003) panel unit root test and Hadri (2000) panel
stationarity test for the ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP (CAPI)
Method Statistic P-value* Cross sections
Null: Unit root for all panel members
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat -4.11984 0.0000 18
Null: no unit root in any of the series in the panel
Hadri Z-stat -1.53963 0.9382 18
* The tests assume asymptotic normality. Automatic selection of lags based on SIC. Newey-West bandwidth
selection using a Bartlett kernel
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Table 3.4: Summary of Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003) panel unit root test and Hadri (2000)
panel stationarity test for the ratio of the claims to the private sector by financial intermediaries
(CREDIT )
Method Statistic P-value* Cross sections
Null: Unit root for all panel members
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat -10.4463 0.0000 18
Null: no unit root in any of the series in the panel
Hadri Z-stat 0.84178 0.2000 18
* The tests assume asymptotic normality. Automatic selection of lags based on SIC. Newey-West bandwidth
selection using a Bartlett kernel
Table 3.5: Summary of Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003) panel unit root test and Hadri (2000) panel
stationarity test for the ratio of the three largest banks’ asset to total banking sector assets
(CONC)
Method Statistic P-value* Cross sections
Null: Unit root for all panel members
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat -5.28200 0.0000 18
Null: no unit root in any of the series in the panel
Hadri Z-stat 0.20449 0.4190 18
* The tests assume asymptotic normality. Automatic selection of lags based on SIC. Newey-West bandwidth
selection using a Bartlett kernel
Table 3.6: Summary of Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003) panel unit root test and Hadri (2000) panel
stationarity test for the ratio of the tax wedge (WEDGE)
Method Statistic P-value* Cross sections
Null: Unit root for all panel members
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat -6.22609 0.0000 18
Null: no unit root in any of the series in the panel
Hadri Z-stat -0.45862 0.6767 18
* The tests assume asymptotic normality. Automatic selection of lags based on SIC. Newey-West bandwidth
selection using a Bartlett kernel
Table 3.7: Summary of Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003) panel unit root test and Hadri (2000) panel
stationarity test for the short-term interest rate (RATE)
Method Statistic P-value* Cross sections
Null: Unit root for all panel members
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat -16.1445 0.0000 18
Null: no unit root in any of the series in the panel
Hadri Z-stat -1.30699 0.9044 18
* The tests assume asymptotic normality. Automatic selection of lags based on SIC. Newey-West bandwidth
selection using a Bartlett kernel
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Table 3.8: Summary of Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003) panel unit root test and Hadri (2000) panel
stationarity test for the real exchange rate (EXCHANGE)
Method Statistic P-value* Cross sections
Null: Unit root for all panel members
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat -8.94055 0.0000 18
Null: no unit root in any of the series in the panel
Hadri Z-stat -0.64937 0.7419 18
* The tests assume asymptotic normality. Automatic selection of lags based on SIC. Newey-West bandwidth
selection using a Bartlett kernel
Table 3.9: Summary of Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003) panel unit root test and Hadri (2000) panel
stationarity test for the GDP per employee (GDP )
Method Statistic P-value* Cross sections
Null: Unit root for all panel members
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat -8.58617 0.0000 18
Null: no unit root in any of the series in the panel
Hadri Z-stat 0.41516 0.3390 18
* The tests assume asymptotic normality. Automatic selection of lags based on SIC. Newey-West bandwidth
selection using a Bartlett kernel
Table 3.10: Summary of Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003) panel unit root test and Hadri (2000)
panel stationarity test for the ratio of the flow of credit in the economy to GDP (CY CLE)
Method Statistic P-value* Cross sections
Null: Unit root for all panel members
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat -4.10866 0.0000 18
Null: no unit root in any of the series in the panel
Hadri Z-stat -0.74265 0.7712 18
* The tests assume asymptotic normality. Automatic selection of lags based on SIC. Newey-West bandwidth
selection using a Bartlett kernel
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APPENDIX 4: Estimation results
Table 4.1: Econometric results with LMREG or UNION in interaction terms
Specifications (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Ui,t−1 0.627*** 0.626*** 0.655*** 0.664*** 0.558*** 0.719*** 0.556*** 0.656***
(0.070) (0.709) (0.092) (0.101) (0.093) (0.098) (0.152) (0.115)
LMREG -3.649* -3.572** -1.452 -3.691 3.033 -1.449 6.297 -0.620
(2.046) (2.229) (1.602) (2.729) (2.130) (2.227) (8.851) (1.214)
UNION -0.004 0.012 -0.053 0.070 -0.009 0.126 0.048 0.057
(0.041) (0.026) (0.040) (0.057) (0.064) (0.096) (0.234) (0.072)
CAPI -1.542* -2.016* 3.190 1.051
(0.767) (0.997) (4.287) (1.811)
CREDIT 0.329 2.680 0.863 -0.616
(1.676) (2.703) (9.958) (2.445)
CONC 3.611* 5.150** 4.199 3.744**
(1.832) (2.269) (2.421) (1.782)
CAPI.LMREG -0.252 -1.779
(1.316) (0.026) (3.652)
CAPI.UNION -0.001 -0.021
(0.026) (0.061)
CREDIT.LMREG -0.141 -0.568
(1.693) (9.590)
CREDIT.UNION 0.002 0 .001
(0.082) (0.034)
CONC.LMREG -5.365** -5.756**
(2.250) (2.191)
CONC.UNION -0.136 * -7.424 **
(0.064) (2.667)
WEDGE 0.100 0.078 0.228* 0.059 0.078 0 .252** 0.405** 0.161
(0.089) (0.092) (0.131) (0.176) (0.105) (0.105) (0.194) (0.101)
REPLACE 3.401 3.025 6.539 -3.489 -3.133 -4.910 0.627 -7.668
(6.809) (4.493) (5.564) (9.186) (5.376) (7.346) (8.945) (12.039)
PMREG 0.663 0.848 0.573 1.518** 1.463* 0.992* 0.093 0.538
(0.608) (0.624) (0.812) (0.627) (0.717) (0.561) (0.713) (0.781)
EXCHANGE -4.291** -3.577** -2.585 -4.268*** -0.352 -0.986 -2.929 -3.831**
(1.571) (1.471) (1.699) (1.467) (0.980) (1.166) (2.026) (1.381)
RATE 0.111 0.116 0.092 0.156** 0.053 0.072 0.107 0.135
(0.084) (0.086) (0.138) (0.072) (0.076) (0.101) (0.263) (0.084)
GDP 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000* -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
CY CLE -0.058** -0.043*** -0.042 -0.072** -0.060* -0.088** -0.057 -0.070***
(0.021) (0.019) (0.024) (0.025) (0.029) (0.031) (0.040) (0.020)
Number of observations 314 314 310 310 162 162 152 152
Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
P-value Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) 0.003 0.047 0.014 0.006 0.082 0.071 0.043 0.094
P-value Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) 0.182 0.101 0.115 0.131 0.149 0.150 0.552 0.159
P-value Hansen-Sargan test 0.196 0.229 0.556 0.303 0.188 0.162 0.321 0.109
1. Two-step GMM Robust standard errors for finite sample computed using the correction defined by Windmeijer
(2005) are in bracket.
2. *, ** and *** denote significance respectively at the 10%, 5% and 1% level.
3. The null of the Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) is the absence of residual autocorrelation of order 1 (see
Appendix 2.).
4. The null of the Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) is the absence of residual autocorrelation of order 2 (see
Appendix 2.).
5. The null of the Hansen-Sargan test is the validity of instruments (see Appendix 2).
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Table 4.2: Econometric results with LMREG or UNION in interaction terms:
marginal effects of financial and labour market variables
Specifications (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Part A Marginal effects of CAPI
interacted with interacted with interacted with interacted with
LMREG UNION LMREG UNION LMREG UNION LMREG UNION
LABOURmin -1.567** -1.998** 3.012 0.839
(0.701) (0.862) (3.944) (1.290)
LABOURmean−se -1.693** -1.968** 2.230 0.666
(0.723) (0.705) (2.514) (0.936)
LABOURmean -1.836 -1.915** 1.237 0.250
(1.265) (0.767) (1.420) (0.948)
LABOURmean+se -1.979 -1.862 0.243 -0.165
(1.947) (1.155) (2.454) (1.908)
LABOURmax -2.057 -1.802 -0.254 -0.801
(2.335) (1.732) (3.341) (3.618)
Marginal effects of CREDIT
interacted with interacted with interacted with interacted with
LMREG UNION LMREG UNION LMREG UNION LMREG UNION
LABOURmin 0.315 2.213 0.806 -0.603
(1.519) (2.431) (9.009) (2.147)
LABOURmean−se 0.252 1.378 0.556 -0.593
(0.876) (1.966) (4.883) (1.914)
LABOURmean 0.171 0.019 0.239 -0.568
(0.691) (1.332) (1.503) (1.416)
LABOURmean+se 0.090 -1.339 -0.077 -0.544
(1.441) (1.102) (6.161) (1.090)
LABOURmax 0.041 -2.830* -0.236 -0.506
(1.983) (1.537) (8.803) (1.272)
Marginal effects of CONC
interacted with interacted with interacted with interacted with
LMREG UNION LMREG UNION LMREG UNION LMREG UNION
LABOURmin 3.074* 3.827* 3.457 2.983*
(1.741) (1.924) (2.311) (1.464)
LABOURmean−se 0.664 2.723 0.193 2.364*
(1.679) (1.757) (2.174) (1.250)
LABOURmean -2.292 0.162 -3.949 0.873
(2.131) (1.937) 2.812 (1.053)
LABOURmean+se -5.249 -2.397 -8.092 * -0.616
(3.311) (2.706) 3.940 (1.413)
LABOURmax -6.774* -6.390 -10.172** -2.895
(3.880) (4.325) (4.584) (2.438)
Part B Marginal effects of LMREG
interacted with CAPI interacted with CREDIT interacted with CONC
FINmin -3.650* -1.484 1.817
(2.046) (1.718) (1.802)
FINmean−se -3.670* -1.517 0.387
(2.047) (1.668) (1.548)
FINmean -3.757* -1.570 -0.675
(2.113) (1.779) (1.494)
FINmean+se -3.843 -1.624 -1.738
(2.268) (2.090) (1.769)
FINmax -4.135 -1.750 -2.331
(3.232) (3.237) (1.663)
Marginal effects of UNION
interacted with CAPI interacted with CREDIT interacted with CONC
FINmin 0.012 0.055 0.095
(0.040) (0.051) (0.091)
FINmean−se 0.012 0.041 0.059
(0.040) (0.046) (0.088)
FINmean 0.012 0.017 0.032
(0.039) (0.042) (0.088)
FINmean+se 0.014 -0.006 0.005
(0.041) (0.043) (0.08)
FINmax 0.017 -0.062 -0.009
(0.058) (0.063) (0.091)
Standard errors are in parentheses.
*, ** and *** denote significance respectively at the 10%, 5% and 1% level.
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Table 4.3: Econometric results with COORD in interaction terms
Specifications (1) (2) (3) (4)
Ui,t−1 0.641*** 0.641*** 0.744*** 0.647***
(0.076) (0.1119) (0.132) (0.131)
LMREG -3.982* -2.494 0.360 0.647
(2.288) (2.299) (3.161) (1.210)
COORD -0.192 0.076 4.686* 4.784
(1.258) (1.718) (2.680) (2.983)
UNION 0.016 -0.035 0.028 -0.008
(0.050) (0.048) (0.104) (0.044)
CAPI -1.351 1.541
(1.678) (3.819)
CREDIT 3.514 4.422
(5.229) (7.678)
CONC 7.823* 7.487*
(3.800) (3.814)
CAPI.COORD -0.173 -0.445
(1.077) (1.732)
CREDIT .COORD -1.318 -2.520
(2.364) (3.691)
CONC.COORD -4.877** -4.368*
(2.300) (2.775)
WEDGE 0.057 0.213 0.181 0.141
(0.113) (0.148) (0.163) (0.104)
REPLACE 2.670 6.971 -2.158 -3.501
(5.803) (10.131) (5.971) (11.328)
PMREG 0.962 0.854 1.653** 0.045
(0.860) (0.827) (5.735) (0.569)
EXCHANGE -3.926** -1.511 1.074 -2.605
(1.684) (2.058) (1.978) (1.787)
RATE 0.092 0.071 0.104 0.000
(0.078) (0.157) (0.084) (0.151)
GDP 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
CY CLE -0.071 ** -0.028 -0.070*** -0.063**
(0.017) (0.027) (0.022) (0.027)
Number of observations 313 310 162 152
Year dummies yes yes yes yes
P-value Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) 0.006 0.070 0.095 0.097
P-value Arellano-Bond test for R(2) 0.180 0.160 0.229 0.415
P-value Hansen-Sargan test 0.126 0.610 0.126 0.303
1. Two-step GMM Robust standard errors for finite sample computed using the correction defined by Windmeijer
(2005) are in bracket.
2. *, ** and *** denote significance respectively at the 10%, 5% and 1% level.
3. The null of the Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) is the absence of residual autocorrelation of order 1 (see
Appendix 2).
4. The null of the Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) is the absence of residual autocorrelation of order 2 (see
Appendix 2).
5. The null of the Hansen-Sargan test is the validity of instruments (see Appendix 2).
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Table 4.4: Econometric results with COORD in interaction terms:
marginal effects of financial and labour market variables
Specifications (1) (2) (3) (4)
Part A Marginal effects of CAPI
Interacted with Interacted with Interacted with Interacted with
COORD COORD COORD COORD
LABOURmin -1.525* 1.096
(0.083) (2.207)
LABOURmean−se -1.599** 0.941
(0.702) (1.704)
LABOURmean -1.700* 0.669
(0.948) (1.092)
LABOURmean+se -1.801 0.396
(1.447) (1.316)
LABOURmax -1.872 0.205
(1.846) (1.857)
Marginal effects of CREDIT
Interacted with Interacted with Interacted with Interacted with
COORD COORD COORD COORD
LABOURmin 2.196 1.902
(2.983) (4.027)
LABOURmean−se 1.638 1.027
(2.111) (2.785)
LABOURmean 0.861 -0.515
(1.268) (0.909)
LABOURmean+se 0 .083 -2.057
(1.628) (2.026)
LABOURmax -0.439 -3.138
(2.353) (3.533)
Marginal effects of CONC
Interacted with Interacted with Interacted with Interacted with
COORD COORD COORD COORD
LABOURmin 2.945 3.118
(1.892) (1.884)
LABOURmean−se 1.153 1.602
(1.499) (1.322)
LABOURmean -1.821 -1.071
(1.787) (1.047)
LABOURmean+se -4.796 -3.745*
(2.841) (1.917)
LABOURmax -6.810* -5.618*
(3.690) (2.720)
Part B Marginal effects of COORD
Interacted with Interacted with Interacted with
CAPI CREDIT CONC
FINmin -0.192 -0.226 3.580
(1.257) (1.441) (2.215)
FINmean−se -0.206 -0.533 2.280
(1.235) (1.338) (1.711)
FINmean -0.266 -1.031 1.314
(1.209) (1.618) (1.393)
FINmean+se -0.325 -1.530 0.347
(1.292) (2.246) (1.170)
FINmax -0.526 -2.708 -0.191
(2.094) (4.139) (1.110)
*, ** and *** denote significance respectively at the 10%, 5% and 1% level.
31
APPENDIX 5: Simulations
Figure 1. Predicted U with high concentration (interacted with UNION)
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Figure 2. Predicted U with high concentration (interacted with COORD)
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